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INTRODUCTION 
1Consultants and commentators have suggested that law firms would 
benefit from the implementation of effective business management practices.1
They assert that firms, by failing to implement management plans similar to the 
plans employed by their corporate clientele, have effectively left money on the 
table, and firms that utilize basic business methods are likely to experience 
tremendous gains.2 In fact, one commentator went so far as to claim that “no one 
factor is as important to the success of a law firm as strong leadership at the top.”3
The majority of law firms, however, have failed to take note of this and respond 
accordingly.  “[I]n firm after firm, either the partners will not give real authority 
to anyone to lead the firm, or no partner is considered capable of assuming the 
role of strong leader.  This void leads firms to drift at best and fail at worst.”4
Yet despite the tremendous potential for gains, this paper asserts that the 
current arrangement of power in large American firms poses a significant threat to 
the extensive, dramatic, and immediate shift in the management structure of the 
legal profession.  More specifically, a structural conflict exists between the best 
interests of the firm and the rainmaking partners, in part, because the dominant 
rainmakers are both mobile and the most powerful actors within law firms, and 
for the new model to be successful, these partners must surrender a significant 
 
1 See Deborah K. Holmes, Learning from Corporate America:  Addressing Dysfunction in the Large Law 
Firm, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 373, 404 (1996); see also Ward Bower, A Nation Under Lost Lawyers:  The Legal 
Profession at the Close of the Twentieth Century:  Article: Law Firm Economics and Professionalism, 100 DICK. L. 
REV. 515, 516 (1996) (“Effective management and good business practices are not inconsistent with traditional 
“professional” lawyering.  To the contrary, they are essential in today’s complex economic environment and will be 
even more essential in the future.”). 
2 See Frederick L. Trilling, The Strategic Application of Business Methods to the Practice of Law, 38 
WASHBURN L.J. 13, 15 (1998) (“most lawyers presently use few if any business methods in their practices, so that 
even a small effort can make a big difference.”). 
3 Carl A. Leonard, The Coming of Age of the Managing Partner as CEO, MANAGING PARTNER (Mar. 
2000), available at http://www.hildebrandt.com/Documents.aspx?Doc_ID=896. 
4 Id. 
2amount of power.  Moreover, precisely because the new model requires that 
power shift from the rainmaking partners to a centralized leader, it is unlikely that 
the powerful partners will easily relinquish the authority and influence they 
currently enjoy.  Consequently, those attempting to modify the firm’s 
management structure, and therefore alter the distribution of power within the 
firm, have the arduous task of garnering the approval of the firm’s rainmakers 
since these are the lawyers who are in a position to thwart any proposed 
transformation. 
While this paper argues that there is a structural conflict between the best 
interests of the law firm and the personal and economic interests of the firm’s 
powerful, rainmaking partners, this theory likely does not apply to every AmLaw 
200 firm.  In particular, the most elite and prestigious firms, those comprising the 
top twenty spots on The American Lawyer’s annual list, are generally immune 
from this phenomenon.  In fact, the application of this theory is likely limited to 
firms operating under a two-tier partnership of “equity” and “non-equity” 
partners.  “The conventional explanation for the growth of the two-tier partnership 
is that the bifurcation of the partnership increases the profits-per-partner of equity 
partners, which in turn solidifies the prestige of the law firm and improves its 
ability to attract the best legal talent.”5 But the most prestigious firms do not have 
to adopt the two-tier model because they have already solidified themselves atop 
the legal profession.  Consequently, the prestigious, elite firms of the world have 
little trouble attracting top-notch legal talent and the most sophisticated legal 
 
5 See William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier versus Two-Tier Partnerships in the Am 
Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. __ (2006). 
3work.  The “have-not” firms, those that are not recognized within the legal 
profession as the very best of the best, have migrated toward a two-tier structure 
primarily to gain a competitive edge and retain their most valuable partners.  But 
these firms, by bestowing more power on their rainmakers in an attempt to retain 
their valuable services, are susceptible to the problem identified in this paper.  
Specifically, firms that rely too heavily on rainmaking partners will likely 
experience difficulties if they attempt to migrate toward an autocratic 
management structure.6
Part I of this paper provides a brief overview of Robert L. Nelson’s study 
of the organizational structure and power in four Chicago law firms.  Although 
Part I concentrates exclusively on Nelson’s study, due to the importance of his 
work regarding the composition and power within law firms, the rest of this paper 
also draws extensively from Nelson’s findings.  Accordingly, Part II builds upon 
Nelson’s study and highlights the current structure and allocation of power within 
law firms.  Part III describes the “new model” for law firm management.  This 
model aims to maximize firm efficiency and profitability, and precisely for these 
reasons, it has gained favor among law firm consultants and legal commentators.  
Additionally, this section details the prominent flaws that plague the traditional 
partnership model and the impetus behind the transition to the corporate 
management model.  Finally, Part IV details the difficulty that law firms face in 
immediately implementing the new model.  Specifically, Part IV focuses on the 
legal profession’s general aversion to change, the various reasons dominant 
 
6 Throughout this paper, “new model,” “autocratic,” and “corporate” are used interchangeably.  These 
terms, as used herein, refer to an organizational structure in which the main power is centralized in one individual, 
similar to the structure of most corporations.  
4rainmakers are likely to oppose an autocratic structure, and why their opposition 
is fatal to such a proposal. 
I. OVERVIEW OF NELSON’S STUDY 
In his insightful book about power and the social transformation of the 
large law firm, Robert L. Nelson asserts that the organizational structure of large 
American law firms has shifted dramatically in recent decades.7 Since their 
inception, large law firms operated under traditional conceptions of a professional 
partnership in which all partners were, in some sense peers, or a “company of 
equals.” 8 More recently, however, law firms have gravitated toward a 
bureaucratic organizational structure characterized by “specialization, 
departmentalization, and increasing stratification in the earnings and authority of 
partners.”9 Because of this shift, firms have experienced greater efficiency and 
undergone a notable transformation in the power structure within the firm.  
In his book, Nelson studied and analyzed the organizational structure of 
four Chicago law firms.  Of these four firms, two shifted to a bureaucratic 
structure and two adhered to the traditional structure.  Nelson’s study revealed 
that the two bureaucratically-organized firms benefited from notable gains in 
efficiency and productivity.  According to Nelson, the increase in efficiency is 
attributable to specialization. 10  Specialization in law firms is largely 
characterized by lawyers working in specific departments.  Nelson claimed that 
 
7 ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 
(1987). 
8 Id. at 4. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 25 (“[s]pecialization is the primary means for achieving greater efficiency.  Given a sufficient 
volume of demand for a particular service, a large firm will develop standard forms and standardized processing.”). 
5“departmentally organized work-group structures place lesser demands on 
lawyers’ time than do ill-defined collections of case teams and office 
specialties.”11 In fact, according to Nelson, “[t]o compete with inside counsel and 
other firms, the large law firm must become a bureaucratic work apparatus that 
maximizes efficiency by coordinating the activities of diverse groups of technical 
specialists or by assembling work teams capable of handling large-scale 
projects.”12 After analyzing the different organizational structures utilized by the 
firms in his sample, Nelson concluded that “[t]he relative efficiency of 
departmental work structures suggests that bureaucratically organized firms may 
have a competitive advantage in the market for corporate legal services.”13 
Not only do law firms realize gains in efficiency through the establishment 
of distinct practice departments, but firms also benefit from the unique division of 
labor within the firm.  Within each department, and indeed, throughout the entire 
firm, the division of labor is an important element in maximizing efficiency.  
Nelson noted that “the organization of work in the law firm is fundamentally 
different from that in the industrial organization.”14 He continued: 
The law firm retains a status-based division of labor in which the senior partners 
use the skill, commitment, and professionalism of junior partners and associates.  
Rather than seeking to reduce the level of skill in legal work, the elite firms have 
actively sought to cultivate the specialized skill base necessary to attract the 
 
11 Id. at 187. 
12 Id. at 159. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 170. 
6business of corporate clients in a rapidly changing and uncertain legal 
environment.15 
Efficiency is not the only by-product of the internal organizational shift.  
“The resulting ‘new structure’ of firms is marked by the emergence of a 
distinctive managerial elite, and increasing disparities in the status and income of 
partners.” 16  Instead of a “company of equals,” firms are now comprised of 
partners with varying degrees of power, based, in large part, on the size of a 
lawyer’s “book of business.”  Consequently, Nelson maintains that “a position of 
managerial authority in the firm, whether it be membership on the governing 
committee, a position at the head of a department, or managing partner, will 
always be subordinate to the power of the lawyers controlling the largest bloc of 
clients.”17 In addition to the disparities among partners, firms operating under a 
bureaucratically organized system have a “new managerial ideology, which 
sanctions efforts to attract clients and notable attorneys, actions that would have 
been thought “unprofessional” only a few years ago, and which seeks to 
reorganize the firm internally by improving efficiency and providing additional 
rewards for those lawyers bringing business to the firm.”18 This new ideology 
makes clear the power of the client-controlling lawyers. 
Overall, Nelson recognized that the internal structure of law firms has 
undergone a dramatic organizational shift, and as a result of this shift, firms are 
more efficient.  One factor responsible for the increase in efficiency is the 
 
15 Id. at 171. 
16 Id. at 38. 
17 Id. at 224. 
18 Id. at 38. 
7bureaucratic organizational structure, characterized by a hierarchical division of 
labor that includes three general categories, comprised of attorneys responsible 
for “finding” clients, attorneys responsible for “minding” to the needs of those 
clients, and attorneys responsible for “grinding” out the actual work for these 
clients.  According to Nelson, “It is this status-based hierarchy that is the most 
prominent feature of the organization of work [within the law firm].”19 
II. THE STRUCTURE OF LARGE AMERICAN LAW FIRMS 
A. Composition of the Large Law Firm 
1. Partners & Associates 
To understand the importance and relevance of Nelson’s study, it is 
necessary to explain more fully the basic relationship between the actors within 
law firms, and their role in maximizing efficiency.  The base of the law firm 
pyramid is comprised of the “grinders,” which typically consist of young partners 
and associates.20 According to Nelson, “Leaders of firms readily admit that they 
buy associates’ time “wholesale and sell it retail,” making the work of associates 
an important source of surplus for the partnership.”21 At the top of the pyramid 
are the “finders.”  These are the rainmakers; the lawyers responsible for attracting 
new clients. 22  These lawyers are the dominant colleagues in the firm, and 
 
19 Id. at 188. 
20 Id. at 75. 
21 Id. at 77. 
22 See e.g., Michael D. Freeborn, Reining the Rainmaker, 85 ILL. B.J. 231 (1997)  
Everyone in the village has toiled long and hard.  The soil has been turned, the seeds 
have been planted, the sun has shown brightly – perhaps too brightly.  Now the 
ground is parched and cracking.  All we need is a little rain.  With a rainmaker, the 
harvest might be plentiful.  Without a rainmaker, the village might starve.  Everyone 
else has done their job well.  Now, if only someone could make rain. 
8typically, they can dictate the ideology by which the firm is governed.23 Hence, 
for obvious reasons, the quest among associates to become a partner is 
exceedingly competitive.24 
a) Internal Pressures and Rewards 
Unlike previous decades, a young lawyer cannot simply work hard and 
expect to succeed by rising up the ranks of a large law firm.  Associates who 
employ such a strategy will undoubtedly exit the firm before becoming partner.  
To make partner, it is imperative that a young associate develop a book of 
business.  Increasingly, law firms are placing more emphasis on client 
development and control in making partnership decisions.25 In fact, those who 
fail to cultivate their own relationships with clients can, no doubt, expect to be a 
casualty of the “up or out” system.26 
Even if an associate is fortunate enough to make partner, the pressures and 
demands are not likely to cease.  A prominent example of the continued stress that 
accompanies one to the partnership ranks is the demotion of almost ten percent of 
Sidley & Austin’s partners in late 1999.27 In an effort to improve profits, Sidley’s 
management team demoted about 35 partners who failed to perform at a level 
they previously maintained.28 The unexpected demotion of so many partners sent 
 
23 See NELSON, supra note 7, at 79-80. 
24  See Marc Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-to-Partner 
Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747 (1990) (detailing the “tournament” among 
associates to make partner in a law firm). 
25 MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG 
LAW FIRM 30 (1991) (noting that in the 1960s, “[p]artners were chosen for proficiency, hard work, and ability to 
relate to clients.  But in many cases there was some consideration of the candidate’s ability to attract business….”). 
26 See id. at 28 (“One of the basic elements of the big firm is the “up-or-out” rule, which prescribes that 
after a probationary period the young lawyer will either be admitted to the partnership or will leave the firm.”). 
27 Amada Ripley, Seniority Complex, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, June, 2000, at 83. 
28 See id. 
9a clear message to the remaining partners and associates:  “Pull your weight, or 
you’ll lose your heft.  And that means the demotions achieved at least one goal, 
by jump-starting all the attorneys.”29 
To avoid a similar fate, it is crucial for partners and associates, alike, to 
develop their own book of business.  Because, “[i]n the law firm the power of the 
dominant colleagues derives from their relationships with clients.”30 Thus, a 
lawyer lacking a significant book of business is susceptible to the decisions of the 
most powerful partners.   
Aside from job security, client-control is a considerable determinant of 
compensation within the firm.  Nelson discovered that “[t]he distribution of 
income follows a strikingly common pattern across the four firms: the 
overwhelmingly powerful predictors of income differences are seniority and 
client responsibility.”31 In fact, even more recently, law firms have shifted toward 
a compensation structure that increasingly rewards a lawyer’s ability to bring in 
new clients and create business over any other factor.32 Consequently, due to the 
incentives to bring in business, lawyers are encouraged to divert a substantial 
amount of effort toward rainmaking activities.  And because managerial power 
and client responsibility are positively correlated, a lawyer with a substantial book 
 
29 Id. 
30 NELSON, supra note 7, at 227. 
31 Id. at 191. 
32 Altman Weil, Report to Legal Management: Partner Compensation Systems – How Firms Distribute 
Owner Profits (James Wilber ed. 2000) (noting that business organization and client responsibility are two of the 
most important factors considered by firms when making compensation decisions). 
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of business is best positioned to succeed within the firm, whether as a partner or 
an associate.33 
B. Client Control:  The Source of Financial & Managerial Power 
For better or for worse, virtually all power within a law firm derives from 
client control.34 This is a prominent theme throughout Nelson’s book.35 “At the 
top of the decision-making pyramid on any case or matter is the colleague with 
the strongest links to clients….”36 This decision-making pyramid solidifies the 
firm’s internal hierarchy by allocating a great amount of power and a major 
portion of the profits to the lawyers with substantial client responsibility. 37 
Consequently, even a cursory examination of the structure of and power within 
law firms reveals the significance of client control. 
 Precisely because rainmakers are the most powerful actors in large law 
firms, commentators are suggesting that young associates treat their careers like a 
small business, and develop methods to attract clients.38 This is intensifying the 
competition among young lawyers, and even older partners, who realize that if 
they don’t develop the skills necessary to bring in business, they are likely to find 
 
33 See NELSON, supra note 7, at 227 (noting that client-control trumps any position on the management 
committee). 
34 See id. at 217, 224 (“[a]ttaining client responsibility is viewed as a professional achievement” and 
“[b]ureaucratization in the law firm will always be subject to the prerogatives of the client-responsible elite.”); see 
also Robert W. Hillman, Professional Partnerships, Competition, and the Evolution of Firm Culture: The Case of 
Law Firms, 26 J. CORP. L. 1061, 1067 (2001) (recognizing that firms are reallocating income in favor of partners 
with loyal client bases, which is often combined with a consolidation of management in the hands of these same 
lawyers). 
35 See generally NELSON, supra note 7, at 208, 227 (noting “[t]he firm is a kingdom; the lords are those 
who control clients.”). 
36 Id. at 227. 
37 See id. at 275 (“Whether recognized formally by changes in the partnership agreement or not, many 
firms consist of a dual partnership in which lawyers with substantial client responsibility run the firm and take home 
a major portion of the profits while other lawyers function as little more than salaried staff.”). 
38 See Holmes, supra note 1, at 408-409 (noting that “a principal of one of the largest legal recruiting firms 
in the country counsels new lawyers to concentrate on becoming rainmakers, because doing so will give them the 
greatest flexibility – initially within their firms and, later, elsewhere.”). 
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themselves out of a job.  Lawyers who can establish and cultivate relationships 
with clients realize more power than their non-client-controlling colleagues, in 
part, due to increased mobility.  “Over the last two decades, aggressive 
application of the principle of client choice, [which allows clients to change 
lawyers or law firms at any time], has greatly enhanced lawyer mobility and made 
lateral movement of lawyers among firms an accepted part of the culture of the 
legal profession.”39 And the trend toward lateral hiring is no longer confined to 
associates – it now applies to all levels of partnership. 40  This has had an 
incredible effect on the profession, in part, because it has greatly amplified 
competition among law firms.41  “Increasingly, competition is internalized as 
firms recognize that their current partners pose a significant competitive threat for 
the future.”42 The intensity of the internal competition is so fierce because, as one 
name partner in a large Chicago law firm said, firms tend to “deify their so-called 
rainmakers.”43 According to this lawyer, “A week does not go by without some 
headhunter calling me to say that he knows of a rainmaker in another firm, 
interested in moving.”44 Consequently, an unhappy lawyer who has a “portable 
practice” can leave with his clients and go in search of greener pastures.45 
39 Hillman, supra note 34, at 1062. 
40 See ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY § 1:2 – 1:4 (1997) 
41 Id. 
42 Id. For an insightful view on internal competition among senior associates, see Bruce MacEwen, The 
Law Breeds Immature Business People, Adam Smith, Esq., available at 
http://www.bmacewen.com/blog/archives/2004/08/the_law_breeds.html (Aug. 9, 2004) (“The economic logic is 
simple:  Senior associates who develop a loyal book of business are in a vastly superior bargaining position vis-a-vis 
their firm than their client-less peers.  They can, without boasting, let it be known they could take their business 
elsewhere if they aren't anointed partners.”). 
43 See Freeborn, supra note 22, at 231. 
44 Id. 
45 See HILLMAN, supra note 40, at § 1:1 (“[I]ncreased mobility has permitted lawyers with the ability to 
transport clients and revenues to demand a larger share of firm income.  Bolstering the unsatisfied partner’s 
12
For all of the aforementioned reasons, dominant rainmakers have been 
able to exert a tremendous amount of influence on issues relating to firm 
management.  Specifically, dominant rainmakers have been able to reallocate firm 
income in their favor,46 and dictate the governance of the firm.47 Indeed, the 
partners who control the most important clients are well-positioned to continue to 
wield a colossal amount of influence on virtually all aspects of the firm.  In 
particular, because the firm relies so heavily on the clients these partners control 
and the revenue they generate, it is unlikely that the firm could experience a 
significant managerial shift without the endorsement and cooperation of these 
powerful partners. 
III. LAW FIRM MANAGEMENT:  THE “NEW MODEL” 
 Although increased efficiency was a result of the shift to a bureaucratic 
organizational structure, some critics claim that a more dramatic transformation is 
necessary if firms wish to maximize efficiency.48 The general critique is simple:  
the partnership model is outdated and inefficient.49 In the words of one observer, 
“when a partnership comprises hundreds of people, many of whom barely know 
one another, the partnership model of management has most likely been stretched 
 
demands is the ever-present threat of the lawyer’s leaving and “grabbing” what many regard as the firm’s assets – its 
clients.”). 
46 See Hillman, supra note 34, at 1067. 
47 See NELSON, supra note 7, at 79-80 (“The dominant colleagues, the “finders,” typically can dictate the 
ideology by which the organization is governed.” 
48 See Holmes, supra note 1, at 375 (arguing that, to increase efficiency, “firms should break new ground 
by replacing partnership with a more rational management structure and changing (and lowering) attorney 
compensation”). 
49  See JAY W. LORSCH & THOMAS J. TIERNEY, ALIGNING THE STARS: HOW TO SUCCEED WHEN 
PROFESSIONALS DRIVE RESULTS 52 (2002) (“In a rapidly changing environment, yesterday’s strategy is seldom the 
answer to tomorrow’s problems.  This is obvious, yet time and again firms maintain the status quo (or make half-
hearted efforts at strategic change), even in the face of large-scale upheaval in client needs or competitive 
dynamics.”). 
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beyond its useful limits.”50 Thus, to succeed, large law firms must abandon the 
partnership model, which is based on consensus, not efficiency, and utilize the 
corporate model of management.  This, observers claim, will allow firm leaders to 
establish the vision and general direction of the firm, thereby increasing overall 
efficiency and productivity.51 Moreover, observers maintain that firms that fail to 
recognize the benefits of the new model will likely discover their strategic 
misfortune only after it is too late.52 Although sound in theory, and certainly not 
impossible, this paper cautions that such a dramatic shift in the management 
structure of the large law firm will be a difficult and arduous task, in part, because 
firms rely so heavily on the clients these partners control and service.  
Accordingly, in an effort to appease and retain their most important lawyers, firms 
have showered these individuals with a significant degree of power and 
autonomy.  This power and autonomy, however, makes it extremely unlikely that 
the partners will quickly and easily surrender these hard-earned benefits. 
A. Forces Driving the Change 
Initially, it is helpful, and almost certainly necessary, to detail the forces 
driving the need for law firms to abandon the traditional partnership model and 
adopt the corporate model.  Although not an all-encompassing list, these factors 
are, arguably, the most prominent. 
 
50 Holmes, supra note 1, at 405. 
51 See id. at 407 (noting that the use of professional managers is likely to “yield a successful quality 
initiative – vision and overall direction provided at the top of the organization, with responsibility (and authority) for 
operating decisions delegated to smaller groups”). 
52 LORSCH & TIERNEY, supra note 49, at 51 (“The financial impact of strategic obsolescence may not be 
fully apparent for years.”). 
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1. Increased Competition for Clients 
Despite decades of resistance, it is now generally recognized that the 
practice of law is, undoubtedly, a business.53 Much of the force behind this 
realization is the intense competition for clients.  Generally, the increased 
competition is attributable to two principal factors: (a) intense competition for 
lawyers and (b) new competition from nontraditional providers of legal services. 
a) Competition for Lawyers 
Over the past few decades, the number of lawyers has grown 
dramatically.54 Consequently, there is greater competition for clients.55 As the 
previous section on rainmakers explained, the competition is generally 
internalized now that firms recognize that their “current partners pose a 
significant competitive threat for the future.”56 There are two main factors that 
contribute to the fierce competition for lawyers.  First, in contrast to past decades, 
clients are no longer married to a firm.  As evidenced by the accepted practice of 
lawyer mobility, client loyalties run to individual lawyers, not the firms for whom 
the lawyers work.57 Thus, lawyers with their own substantial book of business are 
highly sought after by other law firms.58 The second, and more obvious reason 
that competition for lawyers is so fierce is that “[t]alent is a [law firm’s] only 
 
53 Shawn W. Cutler & David A. Daigle, Using Business Methods in the Law: The Value of Teamwork 
among Lawyers, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 195, 195 (2002) (“the contemporary practice of law may be best 
understood structurally as both a competitive business practice and a noble profession.”). 
54 See Susan S. Samuelson, The Organizational Structure of Law Firms: Lessons from Management 
Theory, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 645, 653 (1990); see also Susan S. Samuelson & L.J. Jaffee,  A Statistical Analysis of Law 
Firm Profitability, 70 B.U.L. REV. 185, 189 (1990) (“Between 1960 and 1985, the number of lawyers in the United 
States more than doubled -- from 285,933 to 655,191, increasing at almost twice the rate of the general 
population.”). 
55 See Samuelson, supra note 54, at 653. 
56 Hillman, supra note 34, at 1062. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. at 1065–1066. 
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sustainable source of competitive advantage.”59 According to Jay Lorsch and 
Thomas Tierney, within a law firm, “[t]he people you pay are more important 
over time than the people who pay you.”60 Consequently, to achieve and maintain 
greatness, firms must attract and retain stars lawyers, who, in turn, attract and 
retain clients and other stars as well.61 But this is an arduous task, because 
“[b]uilding [star talent] begins with the competition for stars, which has seldom 
been fiercer.” 62  Therefore, because their financial wellbeing depends on 
successfully attracting and retaining star lawyers, the most profitable firms will 
likely devote considerable time and effort to this all important task. 
b) Emergence of Nontraditional Competition 
In addition to the fierce competition for lawyers, the legal market in 
general has become more crowded.  Not only must firms continue to compete 
with other law firms for clients, but now they are faced with the added problem of 
“nontraditional competition” from other professional service providers.63 This 
increased competition “has given the consumer the opportunity to shop among the 
various professions for many of the services that have been traditionally provided 
 
59 LORSCH & TIERNEY, supra note 49, at 64–65 (“[Star talent] is what can create a firm’s enduring 
competitive edge.”). 
60 Id. at 64. 
61 See id. at 65. 
62 Id. at 65. 
63  See Stephen P. Gallagher, How Should Law Firms Respond to New Forms of Competition?¸52 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1049, 1049–50 (2002); see also Audrey I. Benison, The Sophisticated Client: A Proposal for the 
Reconciliation of Conflicts of Interest Standards for Attorneys and Accountants, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 699, 699 
(2000) (“lawyers are being forced to react to external market pressures by non-lawyers offering quasi-legal services 
or multidisciplinary practices.”). 
16
by attorneys.”64 Consequently, the current market for legal services is undeniably 
a “buyer’s market.”65 
In the new market, “the client drives the price, delivery and efficiency of 
legal services.”66 Accordingly, to survive and succeed in this market, firms must 
be innovative and have strong, competent leadership.67 
2. Increased Client Sophistication & Demands 
As a result of the current “buyer’s market,” clients are well-positioned to 
demand better, cheaper service, in part, because they are more sophisticated.  In 
fact, “client sophistication has contributed to the growth of in-house law 
departments, which have considerably changed the relationship between lawyers 
and clients.”68 With the advent and proliferation of in-house legal departments 
and nontraditional legal service providers flooding the market, clients are able to 
dictate the cost and manner in which legal services are delivered.  Indeed, 
“[c]orporate clients, seeking to control the cost of legal services, regularly 
challenge the decisions of their law firms as to the requisite volume, quality and 
 
64 Gallagher, supra note 63, at 1050; see also Susan S. Samuelson & L.J. Jaffee,  A Statistical Analysis of 
Law Firm Profitability, 70 B.U.L. REV. 185, at 189. 
65 See F. Leary Davis, Back to the Future: The Buyer’s Market and the Need for Law Firm Leadership, 
Creativity, and Innovation, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 147, 148 (1994) (describing buyer’s market as a market in which 
“lawyers and most of the services they offer are plentiful, buyers have a wide range of choice, and prices should be 
low.”). 
66 Gallagher, supra note 63, at 1050. 
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cost of legal resources.”69 Consequently, “partners in U.S. law firms are anxious 
about their economic prospects.”70 
The new realm of client sophistication is evidenced by E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours Co.’s “Dupont Legal Model.” 71  Essentially, DuPont and other 
corporations following this model use “fewer law firms and other legal-related 
service providers, develop a close relationship and a detailed playbook with them, 
then measure results to determine best practices.”72 Before adopting this model, 
DuPont worked with more than 350 law firms; now, they use just 41.73 For 
DuPont, at least, the benefits are tremendous.  The company enjoys increased 
control over the firms it employs, and this control translates into a better bottom 
line.  By exerting control over price and how legal services are delivered, DuPont 
saved $8.8 million in legal bills in 2002 alone.74 
Collectively, these factors have contributed to the new legal marketplace.  
A marketplace in which the “[b]argaining power has shifted from law firms to 
clients….”75 Hence, the need for competent leadership is greater than ever for 
firms that want to survive in today’s competitive legal market, because it is quite 
clear that they cannot “grow and prosper simply by engaging in “business as 
usual,” nor can they “manage” their way around the current challenges.”76 
69 William Kummel, A Market Approach to Law Firm Economics: A New Model for Pricing, Billing, 
Compensation and Ownership in Corporate Legal Services, 1996 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 379, 379–80 (1996). 
70 Bower, supra note 68, at 519. 
71 See Do it the DuPont Way, ABA Journal 27 (Apr. 2004). 
72 Do it the DuPont Way, ABA Journal 27 (Apr. 2004). 
73 Do it the DuPont Way, ABA Journal 27 (Apr. 2004). 
74 See Renee Deger, Legal-Work Outsourcing Cuts Costs, N.J. L. J. (Nov. 17, 2003). 
75 Kummel, supra note 69, at 379. 
76 James Jones & Carl A. Leonard, The Price of Leadership, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL (Sept. 10, 2002), 
available at http://www.hildebrandt.com/Documents.aspx?Doc_ID=1140. 
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The emergence of the buyer’s market for legal services seems to render 
the partners with significant client contacts even more valuable to their firm than 
they were in the past.  That is, because the competition for clients is so fierce, law 
firms can ill afford to lose lawyers who control a sizeable book of business.  
Consequently, unless the market reverts to a seller’s market, which, by all 
accounts, is extremely doubtful, the prospect of adopting the new model will 
become increasingly difficult. 
B. The Structure of the New Model 
In their article about law firm management and democracy, David 
Bradlow and Murray Silverman claim that “the traditional partnership form of 
organization is incompatible with the successful formulation and implementation 
of strategy.”77 According to Bradlow and Silverman, the partnership approach to 
decision making within law firms is plagued by a number of significant flaws and 
inefficiencies.  First, the partnership model is “cumbersome and plodding.”78 
Bradlow and Silverman discovered that some groups take several months to 
decide trivial matters.79 Additionally, “groups tend to be political”80 and often 
“strive for consensus more than for organizational efficacy.”81 Moreover, group 
decision making is extremely costly,82 and this organizational structure is likely to 
stifle entrepreneurship, which requires “decisiveness, risk taking, creativity and 
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intuition, all of which tend to be throttled in a committee environment.” 83 
Overall, Bradlow and Silverman assert that the lack of leadership associated with 
the traditional partnership model “will result in uncoordinated efforts, 
factionalism and poor morale, all of which will impede the firms’ progress.”84 
The solution, they declare, is the centralization of a significant degree of 
authority in the hands of an individual responsible for making key policy and 
strategy decisions.85 This, they assert, will allow the manager to respond quickly 
and make better decisions.86 As this section will detail, Bradlow and Silverman 
are not alone in advocating for this organizational transformation. 
Another commentator simply stated, “The partnership structure by which 
virtually all large law firms still are governed is outmoded.” 87  “Today, 
partnership often is an empty formalism which serves little purpose beyond 
helping to maintain the fiction that large law firms are professional associations, 
and not businesses.”88 This commentator, Deborah Holmes, suggested a “new 
model,” which calls for law firms to “replace their partnerships with a rational 
management structure designed to maximize efficient client service and lawyer 
satisfaction.” 89  Like Bradlow and Silverman, Holmes recognized that the 
traditional managerial structure of large firms poses several dangers for firms and 
attorneys.90 “First, relegating decisions to partners all but ensures the mediocrity 
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of those decisions.  Anticipating and solving problems, not strategic thinking, is 
attorneys’ stock-in-trade.”91 Second, firms fail to provide firm managers with 
training in management skills or time to manage because management takes up 
time that could be spent attracting clients and practicing law.92 Therefore, firms 
that promote their “most experienced lawyers to management positions [which 
they most often do] means that instead of spending time on what they do best, 
these lawyers will spend time on something for which they are likely to have no 
talent.”93 
Accordingly, Holmes claims that law firms should hire a professional 
executive to make decisions that have a firm-wide impact.94 This new model 
“would place responsibility and authority for setting the firm’s overall direction in 
the hands of someone who could be expected to provide leadership and vision.”95 
“Moreover, under the suggested approach, authority for day-to-day decision-
making would devolve down to the local level, where it belongs.”96 
Holmes claims that “[d]elegating responsibility to professional managers 
will help to eliminate poor law firm management techniques.” 97  Under this 
approach, the client-controlling partners would no longer dictate management 
decisions.  Instead, a trained executive with significant decision-making authority 
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would improve firm efficiency and the quality of life for many attorneys, by 
allowing those attorneys to do what they do best – practice law.98 
Due to the possibility for increased efficiency and productivity, a number 
of consultants have acknowledged the inherent benefits of the new, corporate 
model.  One consultant, Carl Leonard, observed that strong leadership at the top 
of a law firm is the most important factor to that firm’s success.99 He cautioned, 
however, that lawyers are often poor choices for that important position. 100 
“Unfortunately, the very ingredients that go into making a great lawyer are the 
antithesis of the qualities found in successful business leaders.”101 
Similarly, Bruce MacEwen has dedicated a number of posts on his web 
log to issues of firm management, and in particular, to the benefits of the new, 
CEO-style model.  According to MacEwen, the ever increasing complexity and 
competitiveness of the legal profession compels law firms to pay considerable 
attention to issues of management.102 Firms can no longer afford to be run by 
“enthusiastic amateurs,” i.e., “lawyers in their non-billable moments.”103 
In one post, MacEwen posits that clients will be the driving force behind 
the migration toward an autocratic management structure.104 He explains that the 
biggest single complaint clients have is that lawyers don’t really understand their 
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business. 105  In addition, MacEwen speculates that the reason for client 
unhappiness is attributable to a structural problem with the legal profession.106 
By structural, MacEwen means that “the qualities that make for the crème de la 
crème of the legal profession – extraordinary thoroughness, a focus on spotting all 
the issues, exhaustive research, a high degree of risk aversion, an utter inability to 
risk being wrong – are pretty much a short catalog of all the qualities a successful 
businessperson will not embody.” 107  But, according to MacEwen, the 
introduction of a central leader at the head of a law firm will alleviate these 
problems by forcing the executive to stop thinking like a lawyer and start thinking 
audaciously.  This, in turn, will allow lawyers to be lawyers, and focus on what 
they do best, serving their clients.108 
A recent article detailing Bingham McCutchen’s merger strategy exposed 
some of the benefits that can derive from the implementation of an autocratic 
management structure.109 At Bingham, there is no doubt that the power lies with 
the firm’s Chairman, Jay Zimmerman.110 “Bingham McCutchen…is run as close 
to a corporate model as any Am Law 100 firm.”111 In fact, “[i]ts leader runs the 
firm like a CEO of a Fortune 500 company, and makes no apologies for it.”112 
This model has worked extremely well for Bingham in recent years, as the firm’s 
revenues more than tripled from 1999 to 2003, and the firm has rocketed up the 
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AmLaw 100 list.113 The new corporate model has allowed Bingham to operate in 
a decisive fashion, avoiding the pitfalls that often plague firms operating under 
the partnership-democracy model.  In fact, the corporate model was largely 
responsible for Bingham’s recent merger activity and impressive growth.114 Yet, 
Bingham is somewhat of an anomaly because the firm was able to draw its 
chairman from its own ranks.  According to most consultants, lawyers are often 
ill-equipped to successfully manage a firm in the corporate sense, thus this 
increases the difficulty of finding and installing a successful CEO.115 
In sum, consultants and commentators have embraced the “new model” as 
the management structure of the future.  They claim that firms must implement 
this structure in order to better address client demands and succeed in today’s 
competitive legal market.  According to some commentators, firms that adopt this 
structure are best positioned to realize gains through strategic planning and 
efficiency,116 and those that don’t risk becoming obsolete.  But as the next section 
will detail, those advocating for this managerial shift are likely to encounter 
substantial resistance from a number of fronts; the strongest of which will emerge 
from the faction of lawyers that is absolutely crucial to the new model’s success – 
the firm’s rainmaking and star partners. 
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IV. OBSTACLES TO THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE CORPORATE MODEL  
 
This “new model” is not without flaws.  Even Holmes acknowledges that 
significant challenges exist that might impede the adoption of such a system.117 
Despite the gains in efficiency and profitability that are likely to result from the 
adoption of the “new model,” there are significant barriers to the widespread and 
immediate implementation of this organizational model.  Specifically, the legal 
profession, in general, is highly resistant to change.  Consequently, a drastic 
management transformation is bound to be difficult.  Moreover, the new model is 
in direct conflict with the current power distribution within the law firm, thus the 
powerful partners have an incentive to oppose its adoption. 
A. Resistance to Change 
“The legal profession has long embraced an ironic contradiction: lawyers 
help clients respond to or create change, yet at the same time lawyers steep 
themselves in tradition and pride themselves on professional stability.”118 Only 
recently have large firms altered their stance with respect to change.119 Despite 
the resultant increase in efficiency that Nelson and others attribute to the 
organizational transformation of law firms, firms are not dynamic organizations, 
and they do not respond swiftly to changing market conditions.120 Although it is 
 
117 See Holmes, supra note 1, at 408 (recognizing that the “implementation of this suggestion will entail 
significant challenges and require extensive discussion within firms.”). 
118 Symposium, The Modern Practice of Law: Assessing Change, 41 VAND. L. REV. 677 (1988). 
119 See generally NELSON, supra note 7.  
120  See Susan S. Samuelson & Liam Fahey, Strategic Planning for Law Firms: The Application of 
Management Theory, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 435, 439 (1991) (“Despite the momentous changes that have occurred in 
the environment of law firms over the past twenty years, modern firms are still drawn instinctively to strategies that 
were appropriate between 1870 and 1970 – the great period of development in this industry.”); see also LORSCH &
TIERNEY, supra note 49, at 50 (observing that professional service firms, including law firms, consistently maintain 
25
undeniable that large firms have become more efficient and more profitable since 
adopting a bureaucratic organizational structure, 121  the potential for increased 
efficiency and profitability still exists. 122  Nonetheless, the legal profession’s 
general aversion to change remains a serious impediment to the adoption of the 
corporate model.123 
A prominent example of the legal profession’s resistance to change is its 
long history of refusing to recognize that the practice of law is a business.124 
Even after law firms generally accepted this notion,125 they have been slow to 
employ comprehensive, strategic business plans like their corporate clients.  Two 
scholars blamed the legal profession’s aversion to change on the inherent 
characteristics of the profession.  “Lawyers spend a substantial portion of their 
training and working lives worshipping at the altar of precedent.  It is hard 
therefore, for them to appreciate the necessity of doing things differently from the 
way things have always been done.”126 
the status quo with respect to overall strategy, “even in the face of large-scale upheaval in client needs or 
competitive dynamics.”). 
121 See NELSON, supra note 7, at 187 (“The relative efficiency of departmental work structures suggests 
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Additionally, the traditional configuration of the partnership model 
inhibits rapid change within the firm.  According to Lorsch and Tierney, members 
of professional service firms, including lawyers in law firms, “tend to hang on to 
the comfort of past practices rather than venture into uncharted territory.”127 
Combating this problem in professional service firms is that “a few progressive 
leaders cannot order the troops forward; instead, the troops themselves…must 
essentially vote with their feet to pursue a new strategic direction.”128 Lorsch and 
Tierney continue: 
In most corporations…strategic change can be instigated from the top down.  Not 
so at [professional service firms], where the top may be a partnership with dozens 
(or hundreds) of independent practitioners.  Absent a crisis, the partners tend to 
stay on track and support only modest adjustments to the strategy.  Innovative or 
aggressive strategies rarely emerge from people who are satisfied with the status 
quo.129 
This problem will almost certainly continue to plague large law firms.  
Until these firms recognize the benefits of the new corporate model, it is likely 
that their members will eschew any attempt at change in favor of the traditional 
and familiar partnership model. 
B. The Legal Culture and Opposition to Non-Lawyer Professionals 
Additionally, the law firm culture poses a significant impediment to the 
adoption of the “new model.”  Although consultants and commentators generally 
recognize that law firms are in desperate need of professional administrators,130 
127 LORSCH & TIERNEY, supra note 49, at 50. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
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lawyers, quite simply, “do not respect professional managers.”131 Accordingly, it 
is doubtful that lawyers will embrace a non-lawyer executive, even if such a 
manager can increase efficiency.  “In the highly polarized world of the large law 
firm, lawyers are in charge and everyone else is grouped together as non-legal 
personnel.”132 Therefore, if the legal profession widely adopts the new model, the 
leaders of firms are likely to be lawyers, not non-lawyer professionals.  One 
reason is that the privileged culture of the legal profession is instilled in lawyers 
while in law school.  “In law school, lawyers are led to believe that what they are 
learning is very important, very difficult and very special….  By contrast, 
therefore, every other profession…becomes less important, less difficult, and less 
special.  This makes it difficult for lawyers to have respect for, or consult with, 
professional managers.”133 
In fact, “[a]ttorneys generally are far more comfortable with other lawyers 
at the helm of law firms.  Non-lawyer managers often are suspected by firm 
members of being unable to understand the pressures of practicing law and, 
therefore, their mandates may be accorded little credence.” 134  Indeed, the 
chairperson of one AmLaw 100 firm went so far as to say that the implementation 
of a non-lawyer manager at the head of a firm would be an “utter disaster.”135 
131 Holmes, supra note 1, at 402. 
132 Id. Also, the legal profession is the only profession, in which members categorize non-members in the 
negative.  By that, I mean that lawyers refer to doctors and business people as “non-lawyers.”  To my knowledge, no 
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Consequently, this general lack of respect for non-lawyer professionals will likely 
impede the implementation of the non-lawyer CEO in law firms. 
C. Opposition from Dominant Rainmakers 
Finally, and most importantly, the likely failure of law firms to adopt the 
“new model” is attributable to the composition of these firms.  Since firms are 
comprised of different factions of powerful partners whose primary focus remains 
on servicing their own big ticket clients, there is little incentive to adopt a 
comprehensive, strategic business plan like their corporate clients.  As rational 
actors, these powerful partners have every incentive to maintain the status quo.  In 
fact, a shift from the current power and compensation structure to the “new 
model” would punish rainmaking partners because, under the “new model,” 
power is concentrated in one administrative executive, not the partners with the 
biggest bloc of clients.   
In their book, “Aligning the Stars,” Jay Lorsch and Thomas Tierney 
explore how successful professional service firms (including large law firms) 
manage and organize their star performers so that both the organization and the 
stars prosper.136 They define “stars” as “the individuals who have the highest 
future value to the organization, the men and women in critical jobs whose 
performance is central to the company’s success.”137 “In a law firm, the partners 
responsible for significant clients, practice areas, and offices are the stars.”138 But 
according to Lorsch and Tierney, an organization of stars does not guarantee 
success.  “[E]mploying stars is necessary but insufficient.  They must also be 
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aligned; that is, they must behave in ways that move the firm toward its goals, 
even if this is at their own expense.”139 This, however, is no easy task. 
“[T]he balance of power between the firm and its accomplished 
professionals tilts sharply toward the [accomplished professionals, i.e., the 
partners].  Unlike most corporations, [law firms] are highly dependent on the 
retention and productivity of their senior producers.”140 Not surprisingly, these 
senior producers, or rainmakers, dominate firm culture.  They are capable of 
dictating management decisions141 and are the best compensated attorneys in the 
firm.142 These factors, combined with the reality that clients “often feel more 
loyalty to individual lawyers than to firms,” 143  creates a situation in which 
“lawyers with their own practices are freer to leave a firm than they ever have 
been before.” 144  Consequently, unsatisfied rainmakers upset with their 
compensation or the direction of the firm can take their clients to another firm.145 
And because “[t]he people you pay are more important over time than the people 
who pay you,”146 there is an incentive for the firm management committee, which 
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is typically comprised of the dominant rainmakers, to adhere to the demands of 
these powerful attorneys.147 
Therefore, because firms currently reward lawyers for cultivating personal 
relationships with clients, there is no incentive for lawyers to support a 
management change that de-emphasizes the relationships that they have spent 
years developing.  In fact, the older, more senior rainmakers will be the group 
most affected by a management transformation.  For these partners, this new 
model essentially changes the rules in the middle of the game.  These powerful 
partners have spent their entire careers adhering to the theory that those who 
control the clients can, and usually do, dictate the direction and strategy of the 
firm.  But the implementation of the new model will, in all likelihood, destroy that 
reality. So, unless firms can convince their dominant partners that a shift to an 
autocratic structure will provide measurable benefits, these partners are likely to 
oppose such a transition.  In other words, the firm and its stars must align.148 But 
because the firm relies on the big ticket clients that these rainmakers attract and 
control, the firm faces a tremendous challenge in attempting to undertake a 
complete and sudden shift in the organization of the firm. 
To clarify, the reason that these partners are likely to oppose the new 
system is not solely attributable to compensation issues; if money was the only 
factor, it is certainly plausible that the new CEO and compensation committee 
could fashion a compensation structure that would adequately pay the superstar 
partners who control the big-ticket clients.  On the contrary, the powerful partners 
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are likely to oppose the new structure because it will strip them of the enormous 
power they currently enjoy. 
One might argue that this is a trivial reason for a group of wealthy, well-
educated professionals to oppose a shift that is likely to result in tremendous 
economic gains for their firm, and consequently, for them personally.  
Nonetheless, this is the most prominent obstacle to the immediate, widespread 
implementation of the corporate model.  Big firm partners are driven, powerful, 
and successful men and women.  In addition, they are, “on the whole, a 
remarkably insecure and competitive group of people.” 149  Within the firm, 
associates compete with each other to reach the coveted status of partner.150 For 
the winners of this ultra-competitive tournament, “promotion heightens (but 
doesn’t change) their fundamental need to seek fresh challenges or their equally 
strong distaste for being told what to do.”151 Consequently, the thrill of the game 
and the desire to compete largely explains why “sixty year old lawyers with 
millions of dollars in the bank still bill 2200 hours per year.”152 At this point in 
their careers, these lawyers are not competing over money.  They are competing 
over status and power.  Accordingly, any assault on their power, which took years 
of sacrifices to attain, is likely to be met with a great deal of resistance. 
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Bradlow and Silverman, however, suggest that any apprehension that 
partners have about losing influence over the affairs of the firm is insignificant, 
because in reality, the majority of the partners are already excluded from the 
firm’s informal power structure.153 While it is likely true that the majority of the 
partners have, indeed, been excluded from the informal power configuration of 
the traditional partnership model, the dominant partners have been at the core of 
that power structure, exerting their influence on virtually all issues of firm 
governance.  And while the majority of the partners are certainly important for the 
overall success of the organization, with respect to the implementation of the 
corporate model, law firms should be primarily concerned with the rainmaking 
partners who have shaped the direction of the firm, and who are in a position to 
leave the firm and take their big-ticket clients with them.  These are the partners 
who pose a serious obstacle to the implementation of the corporate model,154 
because in professional service firms, including law firms, “power is attached to 
individuals as well as to positions.”155 Consequently, “power and influence are 
more widely distributed among the partners of a [law firm] than they are in a 
typical, large corporation with a more rigid, hierarchical structure,”156 thereby 
making a radical organizational transformation extremely challenging. 
Thus, to successfully implement the new CEO model, the firm must 
effectively appease the powerful rainmaking partners, because collectively, these 
partners are well-positioned to wield a great deal of influence and, if they so 
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desire, defeat any plan that calls for a drastic shift in firm power and 
responsibility. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The relatively recent structural transformation of law firms had a 
significant effect on the efficiency of these organizations.  Nelson explained that 
bureaucratically organized firms are more efficient than their traditionally 
organized competitors.157 Yet, this structure is far from the most efficient.  Some 
claim that firms that adhere to the basic partnership model fail to maximize client 
services and lawyer satisfaction.158 Thus, to achieve these goals, law firms should 
study and implement a management structure analogous to the structure applied 
by corporate America.159 Although sound in theory, it is unlikely that such a 
drastic transformation will soon take place.  Under their current structure, law 
firms are constrained by a culture and history that is highly resistant to change.  
Therefore, it is rather doubtful that a group of professionals who have a tradition 
of distinguishing their noble profession from the operation of a business, and who 
have long worshipped at the altar of precedent,160 will discard their comfortable 
partnership structure and quickly adopt a management structure analogous to 
corporate America.   
Further complicating this transition is the power large law firms have 
bestowed upon the dominant rainmakers.  These lawyers are the most powerful 
actors in the firm, and a sudden shift to a truly autocratic, CEO-style system 
 
157 See NELSON, supra note 7, at 187. 
158 Holmes, supra note 1, at 402. 
159 Id. at 411. 
160 See Samuelson & Fahey, supra note 120, at 473. 
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threatens to strip them of the power and high salaries they have worked so long to 
attain.  Moreover, observers have long recognized that the prospect of managing 
hundreds of highly autonomous people, such as law firm partners, is as difficult as 
“herding cats.”161 But as Lorsch and Tierney correctly recognize, “the so-called 
cats that have the power – the firm’s formal leader serves to a large extent at their 
pleasure.”162 
Therefore, it is likely that the rainmakers and powerful partners possess 
sufficient power and influence to prevent the adoption of an autocratic system in 
the immediate future.  This is not to say that such a management shift will not 
occur.  In fact, many commentators feel that firms must adapt or risk losing their 
competitive edge.163 However, this paper cautions observers and those in the 
legal profession that such a drastic shift requires extensive planning and a great 
amount of effort, because in the legal profession, “[t]he firm is a kingdom; the 
lords are those who control clients.”164 Therefore, those who wish to successfully 
implement the “new model” face the daunting task of conquering and ousting the 
law firm lords. 
 
161 See, e.g., LORSCH & TIERNEY, supra note 49, at 95. 
162 Id. at 95. 
163 See Holmes, supra note 1, at 406-407; see also Samuelson & Fahey, supra note 119, at 461-62 
(claiming that the competitive intensity of the industry will require firms to develop new strategies); see also Cutler 
& Daigle, supra note 52, at 197 (arguing that legal practitioners would benefit considerably by applying lessons 
gained from corporate America). 
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